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Abstract:An academic conference on the “Oceanic Relations between Myanmar
and China冶 was held jointly by the Law School of Yunnan University, Xiamen Uni鄄
versity Center for Oceans Policy and Law, Shanghai Jiao Tong University Center for
Oceans Law and Policy, and the China Oceans Law Review in Kunming during May
19-20, 2012. Experts, scholars and colleagues from government agencies discussed
in depth the geopolitics between China and Myanmar as well as the ASEAN, and geo鄄
politics as well as maritime shipping between Myanmar and the South China Sea bor鄄
dering countries. They also had in鄄depth discussion on how to utilize resources of the
Myanmar harbors. This article is a summary of the conference on oceanic relations
between Myanmar and China.
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An academic conference on the “Oceanic Relations between Myanmar and Chi鄄
na冶 was held jointly by the Law School of Yunnan University, Xiamen University
Center for Oceans Policy and Law, Shanghai Jiao Tong University Center for Oceans
Law and Policy, and the China Oceans Law Review in Kunming during May 19-20,
2012. The participants, about 20 professionals, included: Prof. Xiao Xian, Vice
President of Yunnan University; Prof. Chen Yundong, Dean of the Law School,
Yunnan University; Prof. Kuen鄄chen Fu, Director of Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Center for Oceans Law and Policy; Researcher Sun Xiaoying of the Institute of South鄄
east Asia Studies, Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences; Prof. He Shengda of the In鄄
stitute of Southeast Asia Studies, Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences; Deputy Gov鄄
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ernor Xiao Jianguo of the Wenshan Prefecture, Yunnan Province; Mr. Zhang Liangfu
of the Border and Maritime Affairs Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Prof. Wu Lei,
Dean of the College of International Relationship Studies, Yunnan University; Prof.
He Yue, Dean of the College of History and Administration, Yunnan Normal Univer鄄
sity; Prof. Li Chenyang, Associate Dean of the College of Humanity, Yunnan Uni鄄
versity; Prof. Qi Hongli, Associate Dean of the Law School, Kunming University of
Science and Technology; Prof. Mi Liang and Associate Prof. Luo Gang, both of the
Law School, Yunnan University; Dr. Huang Tao of the KoGuan Law School of Shang鄄
hai Jiao Tong University; Judge Liu Qiaofa of the Beihai Maritime Affairs Court,
Guangxi Province; Dr. Wang Zelin of the School of International Law, Northwest Uni鄄
versity of Political Science and Law; doctoral students Zheng Zhihua and Jiang Jia鄄
dong of the KoGuan Law School of Shanghai Jiao Tong University. These experts,
scholars and colleagues in government agencies discussed in depth the geopolitics be鄄
tween China and Myanmar as well as the ASEAN, and geopolitics as well as maritime
shipping between Myanmar and the South China Sea bordering countries. They also
had in鄄depth discussion on how to utilize resources of the Myanmar harbors.
玉. “Malacca Dilemma冶 and China蒺s “Two鄄Ocean Strategy冶
Prof. Xiao Xian deemed that the Indian Ocean has become ever more important
following the rise of China because China needs to find a new pathway for trade and
energy source, especially a safe path, and thus the focus is cast on the Indian O鄄
cean. The opening鄄up of southwestern China is opening toward the coastal regions of
the Indian Ocean. The Frontier Strategy is the Indian Ocean Strategy for China. In
order to set aside the “Malacca Dilemma冶, a new pathway for trade and energy
source must be found. With such a background, Myanmar has become prominent in
the strategy as it is adjacent to Yunnan. It is extremely important to use the land con鄄
nection between Yunnan and Myanmar to strengthen the relationship between China
and the Indian Ocean regions to solve energy problems.
Mr. Zhang Liangfu started out by asking where the pathway to reach oceans is for
China. Such a pathway was analyzed from different perspectives on the island chain,
strait and land area. Myanmar is bordering the Indian Ocean to its south, and is con鄄
necting Yunnan to its north. Thus, China may reach the Indian Ocean through Myan鄄
mar with a convenient and rapid pathway. In 1989, Myanmar Premier Saw Maung
proposed that a pathway be constructed between China and Myanmar by combining
both the roadway and waterway. The pathway is to connect Kunming, Ruili, Bhamo
harbor and Yangon harbor with highways in China but by waterway in Myamar via the
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Irrawaddy River. Thus Chinese cargoes may be shipped via highway in the north and
waterway in the south to the Yangon harbor and the Indian Ocean. The railway to
reach the Indian Ocean from China can be accomplished by adopting the Pan鄄Asia
Railway蒺s west鄄line project to connect Dahli, Ruili, Lashio or Tengchong, and My鄄
tikyina to Mandalay of the central Myanmar, from where the railway can reach
Yangon. Together with the pipelines under construction for oil and gas transport be鄄
tween the two countries, the highway, railway and waterway constitute a system for
convenient and swift cargoes shipping from China to the Indian Ocean.
Prof. He Yue further deemed that China蒺s “One鄄Ocean (Pacific) Strategy冶 was
converted into “Two鄄Ocean (Pacific and Indian) Strategy冶 by adding a path to the
sea via Myanmar. The “Two鄄Ocean Strategy冶 should not imitate the previous one鄄o鄄
cean strategy. Historically the United Kingdom tried to reach India via oceanic routes
by adopting a low鄄profile and non鄄governmental style, i. e., utilizing corporations as a
tool for national affairs. China should learn from this tactics. From a geopolitical per鄄
spective, the Indo鄄China Peninsula connects the South China Sea and the Indian O鄄
cean directly. Based on its marginal characteristic of geographic location, the Penin鄄
sula has become a buffer zone among the Eurasian forces. The practical and potential
geopolitical values of the Indo鄄China Peninsula are based on its special and important
geographic location: it connects the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and acts
as a special buffer zone. Myanmar is enriched in abundant natural resources and is
also located in the important land and sea path to the Persian Gulf, acting as a mar鄄
ginal center for the connection between East Asia and South Asia. It also has a great
potential to become a center for resource politics in the marginal zones of the world.
Prof. He Shengda pointed out: Problems of the oceanic relationship between
China and Myanmar are basically how to reach the Indian Ocean from China via My鄄
anmar by strengthening its relation with Myanmar. Firstly, he gave a detailed analysis
of the special importance of Myanmar for China蒺s Indian Ocean Strategy. Myanmar as
the largest country in the Indo鄄China Peninsula is situated between China and India.
It connects the ASEAN countries and borders the Indian Ocean. Thus, it is very im鄄
portant strategically. Myanmar provides an important pathway to reach the Indian O鄄
cean from southwestern China. This pathway can combine highway, railway and wa鄄
terway for cargo shipping. No other countries bordering southwestern China can be
compared with Myanmar. Besides, Myanmar abounds in oil, gas, minerals, timber
and agricultural products. The path to reach the Indian Ocean via Myanmar has good
historical and practical foundation already.
Vice Governor Xiao Jianguo pointed out in concluding remarks that the strategic
significance of Myanmar to China lies in fulfilling four areas of interest: pathway, re鄄
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sources, border security and breakthrough of the containment by the United States.
域. Problems and Challenges in Reaching the Indian
Ocean via Myanmar from China
摇 摇 Prof. Xiao Xian deemed that China and Myanmar have been maintaining a good
friendship for a long time. China has conducted many engineering projects and pro鄄
grams, including the oil and gas pipeline construction in Myanmar. However, recent
changes in Myanmar have drawn attention and a new trend has also appeared in its
foreign relationship and policy. How these changes may affect the relationship be鄄
tween China and Myanmar and the Indian Ocean strategy of China are problems com鄄
manding serious studies.
Prof. He Shengda analyzed the challenges facing China in trying to reach the In鄄
dian Ocean via Myanmar: Firstly, intensification of competition and risk鄄taking a鄄
mong great powers. Increasing influences of the United States, Japan, and India, es鄄
pecially the U. S. on Myanmar are primary challenges to China for its Indian Ocean
Strategy on the pathway through Myanmar. Secondly, since the establishment of the
new Myanmar government, its foreign and domestic policies have gradually been ad鄄
justed, leaning towards the west diplomatically. As foreign demands increase Myan鄄
mar is not satisfied by just collaborating with China only. After development of multi鄄
lateral diplomacy of Myanmar with western countries, the level of Chinese influence
on and relation to Myanmar has dropped in comparison to the period governed by the
Military Junta. Thirdly, the development of Myanmar continues to face many complex
factors, including problems with Aung San Suu Kyi蒺s position, her influence and rela鄄
tionship with the government, problems in amendment of the 2008 constitution, prob鄄
lems in relationship between the government and local militias, and problems with fi鄄
nancial difficulties and poverty.
Prof. Wu Lei analyzed in essence the problems and risks of the oil pipelines
connecting the two countries. He deemed that the safety of transporting oil and gas is
an important link to the supply chain of energy resources. It is also an important and
indispensable part in protecting national energy and economic safety. As the oil and
gas pipeline encompasses one or more countries for energy transport, it is driven by
the interest of bi鄄lateral or multi鄄lateral relationships. It is also one of the focuses for
conflicts of interests and clashes. However, the research on safety of the cross鄄border
oil and gas transport is relatively weak in China. There are distorted perceptions on
strategy and problem recognition as well as failures in risk prediction. Transport secu鄄
rity of national energy resources has often been considered guarded once the oil and
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gas pipeline is constructed. There are scanty analyses and research on many prob鄄
lems, such as the real causes of security problems in pipeline transport, effects of in鄄
ternational geopolitical struggles, government changes in cross鄄over countries, divid鄄
ed assessment on charges for pipeline crossing, involvement of a third party, changes
of main contract enforcement (contracts negotiated by central governments but con鄄
ducted by companies and local governments), and problems involving jurisdiction
and mechanisms for resolving conflicts, etc. Historically, operation of the oil and gas
pipelines was not always smooth, nor safely and stably developed. There were prob鄄
lems causing reduction of transport and supply, even leading to a complete stop of op鄄
eration. The pipeline operation should have been just a commercial activity, but it
may turn into a political problem beyond the economic issue. Construction of the oil
and gas pipeline from Myanmar to China does not necessarily mean that safety and
stability can be maintained for a long period during and after completion of the pipe鄄
line construction. It must also be affected by economy, engineering, technology, en鄄
vironment and political risks. The security of energy resources supply and develop鄄
ment of economy and society in China may be affected and impacted once the oil and
gas pipeline faces a problem and stops transporting or transport security is subject to
interference. The security of energy supply and economic development in Yunnan
Province will be immediately impacted.
芋. How to Meet the Challenges in Oceanic Relationship
between China and Myanmar
摇 摇 Prof. Li Chenyang deemed that only relative, not absolute security could be a鄄
chieved whether on the strategic sea pathway or oil and gas pipeline from the perspec鄄
tive of development. One should not give up because of a lack of absolute security.
The task should be promoted and enhanced under the circumstances of relative secur鄄
ity. The current relationship between China and Myanmar surely faces a great chal鄄
lenge. Development of matters is always changing but these changes should be used
to understand Myanmar more deeply. Previous communications focused only on inter鄄
governmental ones. Now civilian communications and exchanges should be strength鄄
ened to develop exchanges in various societal levels between the two countries, such
as scholars, NGOs, and ordinary citizens. Chinese enterprises investing in Myanmar
should pay more attention to environmental protection, respect and maintain the inter鄄
ests of the local residents, enhance humanitarian help and support, and so improve
the positive image of Chinese enterprises.
Prof. Wu Lei deemed that predictive research and planning ahead should be
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conducted on important issues such as strategy to deal with the challenge of transport
security of the China鄄Myanmar oil and gas pipeline in non鄄technology aspect. These
are based on the importance of the pipeline to the national energy resources and eco鄄
nomic security, and to the constructive strategy of frontier path for the development of
economic society in Yunnan. Other problems involve, for example, unpredictable
risks in geology, engineering, technology and environment, possible change of gov鄄
ernment in cross鄄over countries (political trend after general election, recombination
of parties for power, and military leadership), local militia and minority groups,
non鄄traditional security and intercontinental relationship (U. S. -Myanmar, Indo鄄My鄄
anmar and Thailand鄄Myanmar relationships).
Prof. He Shengda further pointed out that opposition parties such as Aung San
Suu Kyi蒺s are not necessarily anti鄄Chinese on the basis of objective analysis. There
are still rooms for developing better China鄄Myanmar relationship and exerting influ鄄
ence of China on Myanmar. He suggested the following points in regard to the Indian
Ocean Strategy of China through Myanmar: 1. Reaching the Indian Ocean through
Myanmar should be an important aspect of the Indian Ocean strategy of China, and
an important part to realize the strategy. 2. Based on the strategically cooperative con鄄
struction agreement by both sides in June 2011, the strategy on Myanmar is to sum鄄
marize from experience, adjustment, fulfillment and improvement. 3. It should be
clearly recognized that the China鄄Myanmar relationship is under severe challenge, a鄄
daptive competition and intensified risk environment. Treating the political and diplo鄄
matic changes in Myanmar requires sense and coolness. Diplomacy requires dexteri鄄
ty. 4. Evolution of the northern Myanmar should be closely watched, and the war be鄄
tween the government forces and local militia should be stopped through multi鄄chan鄄
nel mediation to keep peace. The oddly developed economic society in the northern
Myanmar should be assisted and reformed toward normal social economy. 5. Using
Yunnan as the frontier to promote the Indian Ocean Strategy of China; enforcing the
strategic supervision and policy support by the central government; treating the ad鄄
justment and changes of Myanmar politics with sense and calmness.
Vice Governor Xiao Jianguo recognized that the interests of the general public of
Myanmar should be paid more attention during the process of promoting the China鄄
Myanmar relationship. Such attention should not be focused just on the attitude of the
Myanmar government or the military forces. Propaganda and communication should
be strengthened so that Myanmar citizens could know what engineering projects are
conducted by China and what benefits are available to the local people. Finally, cul鄄
tural exchange should receive more attention since it may promote and develop tradi鄄
tional friendship among the people of both countries. He further pointed out that
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practical change would not occur in the China鄄Myanmar relationship in the near fu鄄
ture. The Chinese government welcomes the current administration reforms conducted
in Myanmar. Currently the China鄄Myanmar relationship will not be affected signifi鄄
cantly by domestic changes in Myanmar nor international ones. Historically, China
has provided much assistance to Myanmar. The two countries have similar traditional
customs and cultures. Myanmar depends on Chinese to some extent for its develop鄄
ment. Furthermore, Myanmar may worry about possible control by the U. S. Confron鄄
tation that took place between the U. S. and Myanmar before, and so Myanmar would
not lean toward the U. S. too much without proper concern. However, in handling
the China鄄Myanmar relationship, China has learned a lesson from the “ Myitsone
Power Station冶 incident. In recent years China has invested significantly in Myanmar
but its people do not view such as beneficial to their national security. Meanwhile,
spread of the “China threat doctrine冶 also has many negative impacts on China from
attitude change in Myanmar.
Prof. Kuen鄄chen Fu stated the necessity and rights of China in using the coasts
of Myanmar from the special perspective of China as a “nation with unfavorable oce鄄
anic geography冶. Despite having a huge land area with a coastline of 18,000 km,
China is still relatively unfavorable geographically in terms of inland area and popula鄄
tion. Special rules are applicable to countries with unfavorable oceanic geography,
such as bestowing special rights to the land鄄locked state according to UNCLOS.
Based on the spirit of UNCLOS, these countries, to some extent, should enjoy the
rights in utilizing the coastline and harbor resources of their neighboring countries.
Secondly, in transporting oil and gas via Myanmar, China may follow the way the
U. S. transported its natural gas via Canada by setting up a super fund to protect the
affected environment and prevent destruction from terrorists etc. Only when China鄄
Myanmar culture relationship is built up in depth by broadening the cultural effect
and enhancing the service can the oil and gas pipeline transport be stable. Finally,
he deemed that, as a country with unfavorable oceanic geography, continuous drought
over the past years in its southwestern region, and with urgent demand of the water
resources, China should try to negotiate with relevant countries about branching to u鄄
tilize the water resources from upstreams of the major rivers that flow from Southwest
China into Southeast Asia, in order to resolve frequent catastrophes.
Some scholars, however, expressed doubts on culture “ export冶 to Myanmar.
Prof. He Yue pointed out that Myanmar might consider this as a “culture intimida鄄
tion冶 if we played the culture card. China and India are the two countries neighbor鄄
ing Myanmar that are exporting their culture, causing possible loss of the Myanmar
culture. Prof. Li Chenyang expressed similar concerns. China was often blamed in
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international conferences for conducting the so鄄called “economic privilege and culture
invasion冶. As the trade between China and Myanmar is getting closer tie, more and
more Burmese are learning Chinese as it becomes a part of making a living. China
needs to improve its formula and methods in its cultural exchange with Myanmar. Re鄄
searcher Sun Xiaoying stated that most countries in Southeast Asia except for Vietnam
have traditionally clans based on maternity while China has a male鄄dominated system
so that great differences exist in culture. It is more difficult for us to understand the
southwestern Asian culture than the Western one to some extent. For instance, Con鄄
fucius Institute is not allowed to exist in Vietnam. Therefore, we need to devote and
fine鄄tune our efforts in cultural exchange. We also need to put in a great effort to un鄄
derstand culture of the southeastern Asian countries. Effective communication must
be based on true understanding of their culture.
郁. The Significance of Myanmar on Solving China蒺s
South China Sea Problems
摇 摇 Prof. Kuen鄄chen Fu pointed out that Myanmar as a substitute for a safe pathway
to the South China Sea is very important due to the increasingly complicated situation
in the South China Sea as well as the control by others in sailing through the Malacca
Strait and the South China Sea. Furthermore, the tense situation may be buffered by
ASEAN countries that are not related to the South China Sea problems, such as My鄄
anmar, Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Xiao Jianguo also deemed that Myanmar plays a role
as a mediator in the disputes of the South China Sea problems so that good relation鄄
ship should be maintained with Myanmar. However, Prof. Li Chenyang considered it
a problem of great concern as to how much impact Myanmar could exert on solving
South China Sea problems. Based on past experiences, Myanmar tends to keep silent
in international conferences if the topics are not of its national issues. Thus, it is un鄄
likely that Myanmar can be depended on to speak for China among ASEAN countries.
Prof. Li Chenyang further pointed out that it would be impractical to try solving the
South China Sea problems in the near future but they may be controllable. Strategi鄄
cally, China needs to continue to solidify the developed achievement in the Pacific.
At the same time, the strategy to reach the Ocean via another country – the strategy
of entering the Indian Ocean via Myanmar should also be developed. The “Two鄄O鄄
cean Strategy冶 is a unity with no conflict. It should be developed in collaboration
with equal importance.
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吁. Development and Utilization of Myanmar Harbors
and Shipping Resources
摇 摇 Zheng Zhihua deemed it is extremely important to China蒺s Indian Ocean Strategy
to utilize Myanmar蒺s harbor resources despite the facts that China helped build Gwa鄄
dar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong in Bangladesh. He
introduced Myanmar蒺s main harbor resources and status of international investments.
The harbors being built in Myanmar include: Dawei / Tavoy harbor invested by Thai鄄
land, Kyauk Phyu harbor invested by China, Sittway harbor invested by India, and
Thilawa harbor invested by Japan, China and Hong Kong. 1. Dawei / Tavoy harbor,
located at the northern bank of the Dawei / Tavoy River, is the capital of Tanintharyi.
The ITD Company of Thailand signed a memorandum of feasibility study with Myan鄄
mar authority in 1996. The framework agreement was formally signed in 2001. In No鄄
vember 2010, the Myanmar government expressed interest in building a special Da鄄
wei / Tavoy economic district following that of Shenzhen. The Thaksin government in
Thailand had proposed to China to build a canal to connect the South China Sea and
the Indian Ocean at the narrow southern part of the Indo鄄China Peninsula but failed to
realize it due to various reasons. Dawei / Tavoy harbor thus serves as a substitute for
the canal project. It can create an east鄄west economic corridor in the Indo鄄China
Peninsula, connecting many important cities in Southeast Asia. 2. Kyauk Phyu har鄄
bor. China National Petroleum Corp. and Qingdao Port (Group) Co. have signed a
framework agreement on oil pipeline and pier operation strategy with Myanmar and
the pier is located at Kyauk Phyu harbor. In November 2009, China National Petro鄄
leum Corp. began construction of the large鄄scale oil pier, capable of berthing an oil
tanker of 300,000 tons. Huge oil storage container has been built at a capacity of
600,000 m3 . 3. Sittway harbor. India has the “Kaladan Multi鄄Modal Transit Trans鄄
port Project冶 that includes construction of the Sittway pier in Myanmar. In the past,
it was very difficult to transport products such as rubber from Assam to southern Indi鄄
a. When the Sittway harbor renovation is completed, Indian cargoes can be shipped
from Kalkata to Sittway harbor via the Kaladan River. Kalkata is 530 km away from
Sittway. Shipping via the Kaladan River can shorten the distance by one third of that
by land road transport. 4. Thilawa harbor. The Yangon River way belongs to an in鄄
land water way that is the main path in and out for cargo ships in Myanmar. The Thil鄄
awa harbor district is located 16 km downstream from the old Yangon harbor. It is
within reach of the Thanlyin鄄Kyauktan Special Industrial Park in outer Yangon. Hong
Kong蒺s Hutchison Whampoa has constructed the Myanmar International Terminals
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Thilawa (MITT) pier for cargo loading. So far, Japan has put the greatest effort in
investing in the special economic district at Thilawa harbor. A memorandum has been
signed between Japan and the Myanmar government to develop the Thilawa special e鄄
conomic district jointly that covers 2,400 hectares. Myanmar abounds in harbor re鄄
sources, which are also very good. China and Myanmar should develop jointly for
mutual benefits and wins for both countries.
Judge Liu introduced the jurisdiction of the Beihai Maritime Court. Its district
includes Beihai, Fangcheng, Qinzhou seaports of Guangxi Autonomous Region, the
Beibu Gulf and its islands. It also includes river ports of Nanning, Guilin, Liuzhou,
Wuzhou and Guigang, and the Lancang River reaching the Mekong River. The court
takes care of the maritime affairs and cases occurring in the district. Judge Liu said
the purpose of setting up the Jinhong Court is to provide judicial service to the Lan鄄
cang River region on international shipping dispute, and to maintain shipping and e鄄
conomic order in the district. As the Lancang鄄Mekong river is an international one
flowing across six countries, it is important to China蒺s implementation of its regional
strategy in developing the great western China, and also to the advancement of uni鄄
fied free trade and economy between China and the ASEAN countries. The district
has great impact on the economic development cooperation project of the great Me鄄
kong sub鄄region that includes Yunnan, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and
Vietnam as promoted by the Asian Development Bank. To maintain smooth interna鄄
tional shipping along the Lancang鄄Mekong river system requires maritime judicial pro鄄
tection. Judge Liu proposed a mode of help to the sailors who were injured or dead
involving foreign business, in connection with the “10. 5冶 Mekong tragedy of 2011
for the Lancang鄄Mekong river shipping system. This mode includes three items: 1. To
raise the insurance compensation for the injury or death of foreign鄄related sailors by
increasing the premium subsidized by government. 2. To install a foundation to help
those who suffer accidents along the Lancang鄄Mekong shipping system but have insuf鄄
ficient or no insurance coverage. 3. To set up a system of capital for property loss and
risk of the foreign鄄related sailors along the Lancang鄄Mekong river system through spe鄄
cific financial support by the central government. Then a practical capital system of
risks can be built gradually for the development of the Lancang鄄Mekong river shipping
industry.
Prof. Kuen鄄chen Fu further pointed out that the Indian Ocean is the best fishing
ground other than the Pacific Ocean. Myanmar serves as a logistic supply station for
the Indian Ocean shipping ground. It also serves as an important supply station for
the Chinese navy to safeguard shipping in the Indian Ocean. To better develop and u鄄
tilize the harbor resources in Myanmar, one needs to pay more attention to the protec鄄
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tion of the marine environment, to develop and improve the insurance and financial
system, to apply the Build鄄Operate鄄Transfer (BOT) mode to obtain the rights of u鄄
sing harbors and to utilize the advanced international pier management experiences so
that the development of the Myanmar shipping industry can be promoted. To reduce
the dependence on the Malacca Strait, we should strengthen both diplomatic and con鄄
sular protection and improve our overseas agencies for maritime shipping and fishing.
遇. Conclusion
To sum up, as Prof. He Yue pointed out, the geopolitics of a country is closely
related to its domestic political status and international environment. Political stability
and economic developmen in Myanmar will have important impact on the border secu鄄
rity and environment of southwestern China. Under the present situation of complicat鄄
ed and changing world political safety, globalization and sub鄄regional economic unifi鄄
cation, Myanmar will continue to maintain its political stability and geopolitical secur鄄
ity. China will also keep close relationship with Myanmar to promote the Indian O鄄
cean Strategy by strengthening cooperation on political security, economy and other
areas.
(Translator: Prof. CHUNG Yu鄄Chia)
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